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31 May 1962

Copy 7 of 6**I. PROBLEM**

To establish a center within CIA for the purpose of fully exploiting intelligence information on an all source basis.

II. BACKGROUND

Starting with the initiation of the TALENT Control System, the desirability of producing all source intelligence using reconnaissance photography has been recognized. However, prior to consolidating the agency at the Langley Headquarters, it was impossible to provide a centralized area for complete fusion of sensitive materials protected by a number of control systems and codewords. As a result TALENT areas were established within agency components in order to provide intelligence analysts with away-from-desk-space in which to work with sensitive information. This practice, while helpful, has not permitted full exploitation of all sources and consequently has not ensured that the agency intelligence product benefits from broad cross fertilization of intelligence information. The same situation prevailed prior to 1953 when the use of COMINT information was sharply restricted. A decision made at that time to place entire intelligence production components within the COMINT area resulted in much greater use of this source in the intelligence product.

With the advent of the TALENT Control System, other USIB agencies instituted the practice of establishing all source analytical facilities. Some of these are located at the Aeronautical Chart and Information Service, the Engineer Special Projects area, Army Map Service; the Airforce Intelligence Center; and the Strategic Air Command Special Center. The essential element present at each of these centers is the nearly unrestricted use of sensitive

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materials by the analysts housed within them. The CIA, however, has not yet provided such a facility and has thereby not availed itself of the benefits inherent in co-locating source materials with the analysis process.

III. PROPOSED SOLUTION

The ideal solution of this problem requires taking the following steps:

A. Allocating space at Headquarters for locating entire intelligence of the Special Intelligence Area.

gence components within a TALENT center/ (Selection of components involved to be made following detailed study of requirement).

B. Providing security control of access to the ^{center} ~~area~~ by means of receptionist/guard posts and identification of cleared personnel



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^{center}
C. Providing within the ~~area~~ physical separation of components requiring limited access to source materials from those requiring across the board access. (In this regard it is envisaged that personnel not requiring TALENT/KEYHOLE materials be housed separately within the larger center).

D. Modifying along the following lines strict document control procedures as presently practiced by the TALENT Control System:

1. Establishing means for logging multiple copies of TALENT and TALENT/KEYHOLE documents into the center but not requiring strict accountability within the center. This procedure would duplicate the one now successfully in force within the Special Intelligence Area.
2. Setting up a reading panel charged with scanning documents for content and responsible for routing them to analysts within

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the center according to instructions provided. This panel should also keep records of document dissemination in order to answer questions concerning their disposition.

E. Providing the following facilities necessary to efficient functioning of the center:

1. A central library containing one copy of all documents received in the center and given responsibility for maintaining a complete index of document content.
2. A printing plant capable of producing multiple codeword reports. At present reports containing TALENT and TALENT/KEYHOLE information can only be reproduced at NPIC which has limited resources. It is believed that the number of reports that will be generated within the center complex could not be handled by the NPIC printing facility.
3. Briefing rooms for both TALENT and TALENT/KEYHOLE that would provide complete graphic support and space for all-source conferences.
4. An editorial ~~staff~~ ^{group} to insure that center reporting maintains uniform standards of ~~accuracy~~ ^{accuracy}. 
5. A communication facility with connection to NPIC and to appropriate agencies within the intelligence community.

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that appropriate staff work requisite to establishing the type of center outlined in III above be initiated at once.

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